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Treasury Stock and the Courts
By L. L. Briggs
Many corporations throughout the country are taking advan­
tage of a depressed stock market to purchase their own shares, 
thereby creating treasury stock. The attitude of the courts 
toward such stock is the subject of this article.
Most courts consider treasury stock to be corporate shares 
which have been issued and outstanding but later have been 
acquired by the issuing company through purchase, donation or 
in some other manner. While this conception applies to business 
corporations in general it apparently does not apply to mining 
companies. In State v. Manhattan Verde Company (1910) 32 Nev. 
474, the court said that treasury stock of such companies is:
. . such stock as is set aside for the actual development of the 
property.” Obviously, mining corporations may set aside un­
issued stock for developmental purposes and these shares may be 
classed as treasury stock.
In the absence of express authorization the English courts deny 
the right of a limited company on common-law principles to 
purchase its own stock. It is universally admitted in that coun­
try that a corporation has no authority to make a business of 
trafficking in its own shares (Ashbury Railway Carriage and Iron 
Company v. Riche (1875) L. R. 7 H. L. 653).
Let us trace the development of the English rule. In Teasdale's 
case (1873) L. R. 9 Ch. App. 54, Lord Justice James said by way 
of dictum:
“There is no doubt that a company may give itself power to purchase its own 
shares, to take surrender of shares and to cancel certificates of shares.”
At a later date, the same court changed its mind. In Hope v. 
International Financial Society (1877) 4 Ch. D. 326, it said:
" I am reported to have said in Teasdale's case that the power to purchase 
shares would be good. I am not quite sure whether that was not too wide a 
deduction from the cases to which I was then referring, and certainly it was not 
necessary for the decision of the case.”
However, Lord Justice James states that a corporation may ac­
cept the surrender of its shares from a shareholder who can not 
pay and may release him from further liability.
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In Guinness v. Land Corporation of Ireland (1882) 22 Ch. D. 
349, Lord Justice Cotton, after referring to section 380 of the 
companies act, said:
“From that it follows that whatever has been paid by a member can not be 
returned to him. In my opinion, it also follows that what is described in the 
memorandum as the capital can not be diverted from the objects of the society. 
It is, of course, liable to be spent or lost in carrying on the business of the com­
pany, but no part of it can be returned to a member so as to take away from the 
fund to which the creditors have a right to look as that out of which they are 
to be paid.”
The leading English decision on the right of a company to buy 
back its own stock is Trevor v. Whitworth (1887) L. R. 12 A. C. 
409. This decision involves a flannel manufacturing corporation 
with two sections of its articles of association giving the company 
power to purchase any of its outstanding shares and to sell, dis­
pose of them or to extinguish them. The question before the 
house of lords was whether a company could lawfully purchase its 
own shares by any method other than that which the statute pro­
vided with respect to the reduction of capital. Lord Herschell 
said:
“What was the reason which induced the company in the present case to 
purchase its shares? If it was that they might sell them again, this would be a 
trafficking in the shares, and clearly unauthorized. If it was to retain them, 
this would be to my mind as indirect method of reducing the capital of the 
company.”
Since both trafficking in shares and the reduction of capital in 
any manner other than that prescribed by parliament are illegal, 
the house of lords decided that the purchase was illegal because 
the act was in excess of corporate capacity and was inconsistent 
with the nature of corporate organization. Parliament has given 
this decision statutory approval in the companies act of 1929.
In Bellerby v. Rowland (1902) 2 Ch. 14, the directors surrendered 
their shares to the corporation to make good a loss for which they 
were not liable. These shares were not paid in full. Thereafter 
the company prospered and the directors sued for the return of 
their shares and they were able to recover them. The transfer 
was held to be ineffective because it released the directors from 
liability on calls. Collins, master of the rolls, said that there is: 
"... no distinction in principle between returning to shareholder a part of 
the paid-up capital in exchange for his shares and wiping out his liability for the 
uncalled-up sum payable thereon. Both methods involve a reduction of the 
capital ...”
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According to the English view, if a company give a shareholder 
anything in return for his stock, the corporation’s capital, in 
the sense of assets, is reduced. The nature of the corporate 
idea prohibits this method of getting rid of corporate property. 
Consequently, a company must follow the statutory procedure 
for reduction of capital stock in order to purchase its own 
shares.
England, however, permits unlimited companies to buy back 
their own shares. In In re Borough Commercial and Building 
Society (1893) 2 Ch. 242, the court held that the rule of Trevor v. 
Whitworth does not apply to such companies and made this 
statement:
“ By the very force of the terms, it is plain that in the case of an unlimited 
company the creditors know that there is no fixed capital, and, therefore they 
have no right to complain, if I may use that term, of a reduction of that which 
has never been fixed in any way. There is nothing in the companies acts pro­
hibiting such purchases.”
England allows certain exceptions to the rule of Trevor v Whit­
worth. In case of consolidation or reorganization of companies, 
dissenting shareholders have the right to an appraisal and the 
payment of the value of their shares by their company. How­
ever, a dissenter is still liable to creditors of the company after he 
has received payment for his shares (Part's Case (1870) L. R. 10 
Eq. 622) unless the creditors have agreed to look solely to the 
transferee company for the satisfaction of their claims (Taurine 
Company, Anning and Cobb's Case (1878) 38 L. T. R. 53). Eng­
land permits a company to forfeit its shares for non-payment of 
calls and to receive shares as a voluntary gift or bequest (In re 
Denver Hotel Company (1893) 1 Ch. 495; Kirby v. Wilkins (1930) 
142 L. T. R. 16).
Canada follows the English rule. In Alberta Rolling Mills 
Company v. Christie (1919) 58 Can. Sup. Ct. 208, Christie refused 
to purchase stock of the defendant corporation unless his property 
would be increased in value by the erection of a steel plant in his 
town, so the company agreed to take back his stock and refund 
the amount of his subscription if the plant was not built in that 
location. The company refused to erect the plant or to rescind 
the stock purchase, whereupon Christie brought suit to recover 
the amount paid for the stock. Justice Anglin dismissed the suit 
on the ground that there is no power in a corporation to acquire 
its own stock.
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The courts in various jurisdictions of the United States do not 
agree as to the right of a corporation to purchase its own shares of 
stock. According to Justice McIlvaine in Coppin v. Greenless and 
Ransom Company (1882) 38 Oh. St. 275:
“ The power of a trading company to traffic in its own stock, where no author­
ity to do so is conferred upon it by the terms of its charter, has been a subject 
of much discussion in the courts; and the conclusions reached by the different 
courts have been conflicting.”
A few courts have followed the English rule, with some qualifi­
cations, as being more conservative than the majority rule (Mary­
land Trust Company v. National Mechanics' Bank (1906) 102 Md. 
608; Morgan v. Lewis (1888) 46 Oh. St. 1). In Morgan v. Lewis, 
Chief Justice Owen held that a corporation may not traffic in its 
own shares and said:
“We have no disposition to call in question the general and well recognized 
principle that a corporation cannot buy its own stock.”
According to Justice McIlvaine, in Coppin v. Greenless and Ran­
som Company (1882) 38 Oh. St. 275:
. “. . . the right of a corporation to traffic in its own stock, at pleasure, ap­
pears to us to be inconsistent with the principle of the provisions of the present 
constitution ...”
Two eminent authorities on corporation law, Morawetz (1 Cor­
porations (2d edition, 1886) 109) and Machen (Corporations, sec. 
626) support the minority doctrine.
Let us review the arguments against the right of a corporation 
to buy back its own shares. It has been held that a corporation 
is a legal personality of limited powers and is capable of perform­
ing only such acts as are expressly authorized by the state {Cart­
wright v. Dickinson (1889) 88 Tenn. 476). In Coppin v. Greenless 
and Ransom Company (1882) 38 Oh. St. 275, Justice McIlvaine, in 
discussing the power of a corporation to acquire treasury stock by 
purchase, made the following statement:
“ But, nevertheless, we think the decided weight of authority both in England 
and in the United States is against the existence of the power, unless conferred 
by express grant or clear implication. The foundation principle, upon which 
these latter cases rest, is that a corporation possesses no powers except such as 
are conferred upon it by its charter, either by express grant or necessity impli­
cation ; and this principle has been frequently declared by the supreme court of 
this state; and by no court more emphatically than by this court.”
It was decided by the court in Hunter v. Garanflo (1912) 246 
Mo. 131, that if the statutes or charter give no definite grant of 
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power to a corporation to buy its own shares such a purchase is 
invalid. In State v. A. & N. R. R. (1888) 24 Neb. 144, the court 
held that the enumeration of powers which a corporation may 
exercise implies the exclusion of all others, so a purchase of treas­
ury stock would be invalid unless specifically authorized.
The purchase of its own shares by a corporation has been held 
to be in excess of corporate capacity because such a transaction 
does not fall in line with the nature of corporate organization. 
In Trevor v. Whitworth (1887) L. R. 12 A. C. 409, Lord Herschell 
said:
“ It appears to me that ... it is inconsistent with the essential nature of a 
company that it should become a member of itself.”
Some have argued that the power to acquire treasury stock 
by purchase is not necessary to carry on the corporate business in 
a satisfactory manner (27 Harvard Law Review 747). Justice 
McIlvaine, in Coppin v. Greenless and Ransom Company (1882) 
38 Oh. St. 275, said:
“ But where the sole object of the corporation is, as in this case, ‘ for manufac­
turing purposes,’ it can not be said in any just sense that the power to acquire, 
invest in or convey its own stock was either necessary or convenient for 
'manufacturing purposes.’ ”
No state would permit a corporation to be organized for the 
sole purpose of trading in its own shares because corporations are 
allowed only for socially useful purposes. A corporation has no 
authority to make its business that of buying and selling its own 
shares. It has been held that the purchase by a corporation of 
its shares is a breach of a fundamental agreement among the share­
holders themselves and also with the state. The shareholders 
who sell their stock to the corporation leave their liability to be 
borne by the remaining shareholders.
Many courts have held that corporations should be prohibited 
from buying their own stock because such purchases reduce the 
funds available to creditors and thereby impair their security 
(Whaley v. King (1918) 141 Tenn. 1; Kom v. Cody Detective 
Agency (1913) 76 Wash. 541). Persons who deal with a corpora­
tion rely upon the amount of its capital stock and have a right to 
assume that this asset will remain undiminished. If a corpora­
tion pays for its own shares out of capital, it undoubtedly reduces 
the amount available for the satisfaction of creditors’ claims 
(Crandall v. Lincoln (1884) 52 Conn. 73). Furthermore, the 
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rights of creditors are injured if the purchase is from surplus, 
because the number of persons to whom creditors may resort is 
reduced. Treasury stock of an insolvent corporation is utterly 
worthless to creditors (In re Tichenor-Grand Company (1913) 
203 Fed. 720).
In discussing this subject in Coppin v. Greenless and Ransom 
Company (1882) 38 Oh. St. 275, Justice McIlvaine said:
“ If the right of a corporation to purchase its own stock at pleasure exists and 
is unlimited, where is the provision intended for the benefit of creditors? . . . 
They have a right, however, to assume that stock once issued, and not called 
back in the manner provided by law, remains outstanding in the hands of stock­
holders liable to respond to creditors to the extent of the individual liability 
prescribed.”
The following statement was made by the court in Savings 
Bank v. Wulfekuhler (1877) 19 Kan. 60:
"For a bank to use its funds in the purchase of stock . . . might also impair 
or even destroy all security given by law to creditors of the bank. The law 
provides in effect that not only the bank with all its property shall be liable 
for its debts, but also that each stockholder in the bank to the amount of his 
stock shall also be liable. But if a bank may purchase all its stock, and own 
itself, then where would be the security to the creditors?
The power of the directors of a corporation to purchase its stock 
gives them the power to give preference to favored stockholders 
by allowing them to withdraw their contribution to a venture in 
which they have lost confidence (Crandall v. Lincoln (1884) 52 
Conn. 73). They may permit the favored stockholders to with­
draw at an advantageous price (Grasselli Chemical Company v. 
Aetna Explosives Company (1918) 258 Fed. 66). According to 
Justice McSherry, in Maryland Trust Company v. Mechanics' 
Bank (1906) 102 Md. 608:
"The enforcement of the contract of purchase would result in security to 
the shareholders whose stock the corporation purchased at a higher price for 
their shares than could be realized by the remaining stockholders from the 
assets of the concern . . . and thus the capital of the concern might be di­
verted from its legitimate channels and be used for the benefit of recalcitrant 
or cantankerous members to the detriment of confiding shareholders.”
In the case of banks with double liability, the stockholders 
whose shares are bought by the bank escape and leave the re­
maining shareholders with the entire burden of satisfying creditors.
If directors offered to purchase from all stockholders in propor­
tion to their holdings, the action would not be so objectionable, 
but such offers are rarely made. In Shoemaker v. Washburn 
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Lumber Company (1897) 97 Wis. 585, it was held that the rule 
requiring ratable treatment of shareholders in case of reduction of 
capital does not apply when a corporation purchases its own 
stock. It is interesting to note in passing that in Berger v. 
United States Steel (1902) 63 N. J. Eq. 809, the court decided that 
companies desiring to purchase their own stock must offer to buy 
from all equally. So far as I have been able to determine, this 
rule is not enforced in any jurisdiction, not even New Jersey itself, 
for section 29 of the compiled statutes of that state authorizes a 
non-ratable purchase. Where purchases are non-ratable the 
relative status of the remaining stockholders is disturbed.
It is possible that directors may purchase their corporation’s 
shares in such a way as to keep themselves in power and to get 
rid of certain stockholders. In Trevor v. Whitworth (1887) L. R. 
12 A. C. 409, Lord MacNaghten asked:
“ Who are the stockholders whose continuance in a company its executives 
consider undesirable? Why, the shareholders who quarrel with the policy of 
the board, and wish to turn the directors out; the shareholders who ask ques­
tions which it may not be convenient to answer; shareholders who want in­
formation which the directors think it prudent to withhold. Can it be con­
tended that when the policy of directors is assailed, they may expend the capital 
of the company in keeping themselves in power or in purchasing the retirement 
of inquisitive and troublesome critics?”
The house of lords decided that corporate directors can not buy 
shares for this purpose. In the same decision, Lord Herschell 
said:
“I can quite understand that the directors of a company may sometimes 
desire that the shareholders should not be numerous, and that they should be 
persons likely to leave them with a free hand to carry on their operations. But 
I think it would be most dangerous to countenance the view that, for reasons 
such as these, they could legitimately expend the moneys of the company to 
any extent they please in the purchase of its shares. No doubt, if certain share­
holders are disposed to hamper the proceedings of the company, and are willing 
to sell their shares, they may be bought out; but this must be done by persons, 
existing shareholders or others, who can be induced to purchase the shares, 
and not out of the funds of the company.”
The purchase of treasury stock with corporation funds in part 
contributed by a minority opposing the transaction may enable 
a rival majority to get a stranglehold on the affairs of the corpora­
tion, because the amount of votable stock is at least temporarily 
decreased and the influence of the majority is made correspond­
ingly greater. In some jurisdictions it is possible for the directors 
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to convert a minority interest into a majority interest by the 
purchase of the corporation’s shares (Elliot v. Baker (1907) 194 
Mass. 518; Luther v. Luther (1903) 118 Wis. 112).
When a corporation buys its own shares, the enterprise in 
which the stockholders originally invested is not the same. 
Justice Timlin, in his dissenting opinion in Gilchrist v. Highfield 
(1909) 140 Wis. 476, made the following statement:
“ The purchase by a corporation of its own stock not only changes the frac­
tional interest of a dissenting stockholder against his will but it changes the 
character of the property in which he has an interest, . . . The stockholder 
may have depended upon a certain amount of capital which has been reduced.”
The readjustment of voting strength attendant upon the pur­
chase of treasury stock usually injures the small non-assenting 
stockholder. However, if no other purpose than the gain of 
control motivated a purchase, the courts might intervene at the 
request of objecting stockholders in some jurisdictions. In 
O'Connor v. International Silver Company (1904) 68 N. J. Eq. 67, 
Vice-Chancellor Pitney said:
“. . . the scheme of corporate management is that of a representative gov­
ernment, in which the representatives are bound to be governed by and repre­
sent only the interests of those they represent. Hence any device or practice 
which in any wise or to any degree diminishes or prevents the exercise of the 
right of each of the active owners to have a voice in the election of directors 
precisely in the proportion to the amount of his interest is vicious and in posi­
tive contravention of the fundamental principle upon which corporations are 
built up.”
Some courts have held that a purchase of its own stock by a 
corporation may be considered a reduction of capital for a time at 
least (Burke v. Smith (1929) 111 Md. 624; Morgan v. Lewis (1888) 
46 Oh. St. 1). Although the shares are not retired and are carried 
on the books as treasury stock, the stock is not outstanding and the 
effect is the same as that of reduction because the directors can 
keep the stock in the treasury for an indefinite period. The courts 
that have adopted this view have refused to imply any power 
in corporations to make such purchases {Abeles v. Cochran 
(1879) 22 Kan. 405; Crandall v. Lincoln (1884) 52 Conn. 
73). Chief Justice McSherry made this statement in Mary­
land Trust Company v. National Mechanics' Bank (1906) 102 
Md. 608:
”... a corporation . . . diminishes its capital to the extent of the shares 
purchased, ...”
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According to Lord Herschel! in Trevor v. Whitworth (1887) 
L. R. 12 A. C. 409:
“And the strongest precautions to prevent the reduction of the capital of a 
limited company, without due notice and judicial sanction, would be idle if the 
company might purchase its own shares wholesale and so effect the desired 
result.”
Morawetz (Private Corporations (2d edition, 1886) 113) says that:
“ No verbiage can disguise the fact that a purchase by a company of shares in 
itself really amounts to a reduction of the company’s assets.”
Machen (Modern Law of Corporations, 514) states that a pur­
chase by a corporation of its own stock is “a subtle method of 
evading the rule against unauthorized reduction of capital.”
In Meisenheim er v. Alexander (1913) 162 N. C. 226, the court 
held that as between a stockholder and the corporation, a mere 
vote to release subscriptions and cancel shares reduced the capital 
in the sense that the shares no longer existed for any purpose, 
although there had been no attempt to carry out the statutory 
formalities for the reduction of capital stock.
The general corporation statutes of all jurisdictions provide a 
formal method for the reduction of capital stock. In most states 
it is no doubt contrary to legislative intent that a corporation 
shall effect an unannounced reduction of its announced capital 
stock by a purchase of its own shares and thus evade the statutes. 
In Delaware and Florida one of the statutory methods of reducing 
capital stock is through purchase of shares. Massachusetts, 
New York and Colorado require a charter amendment for the re­
duction of capital stock; Louisiana and North Dakota require 
the sanction of the stockholders; while practically every state and 
territory insists upon the filing of a certificate and the approval of 
some state officer. Yet all these states allow a corporation to buy 
its own stock and keep it in the treasury for an indefinite length 
of time. One of the latest statements of the prevailing rule is 
found in Thompson on Corporations (supplement, 1931) sec. 3685:
“ It is not illegal for a corporation to retire its stock if it has sufficient surplus 
so that the rights of creditors will not be adversely affected.”
If a corporation has no debts, it may purchase all of its own 
stock in some states. In Brown v. Fire Insurance Company of 
Chicago (1932) 265 Ill. App. 393, it was held that in the absence 
of unfair dealing or fraud of some kind, there is no reason why a 
corporation can not purchase all of its own stock and retire from 
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business and by this method distribute its assets to its stock­
holders. It would be impossible for a corporation to pay more 
than book value for all of its stock and, if it paid book value, there 
would be no difficulty because there would be nothing left of the 
corporate assets after the purchase. It is possible, however, for a 
corporation to buy back all of its stock for less than book value. 
In that case some assets would remain after all the stock had been 
purchased. Would the corporation vanish into nothing and leave 
these assets without an owner?
Advocates of the minority doctrine argue that a purchase of a 
corporation’s own stock from surplus is unjust because at the 
time of subscription the subscribers did not anticipate diversion 
of profits to permit a few members to retire their capital con­
tributions and thereby delay the payment of dividends to the 
others. If the purchase price is above the book value the share 
of the remaining stockholders in the surplus is lessened, while if 
the purchase price is below book value the interest of the rest of 
the stockholders in the surplus is increased. Sale of the stock 
to the corporation at book value does not affect the equity of the 
remaining stockholders. No matter what price is paid for the 
stock, surplus assets (in the payment) are paid out and conse­
quently are not available for dividends to the stockholders who 
have retained their shares in the company.
In the minority view a purchase by a corporation of its own 
stock is a nullity and may be set aside by an interested party. 
This may be done by the vendor (Darnell-Love Lumber Company 
v. Wiggs (1921) 141 Tenn. 113) or by a trustee of the corporation 
(Whaley v. King (1918) 141 Tenn. 1). The contract is so illegal 
that in Maryland Trust Company v. National Mechanics' Bank 
(1906) 102 Md. 608, the court held that a bank was not able to 
collect from the corporation a loan made to it for the purpose of 
such a purchase.
In Currier v. Lebanon Slate Company (1875) 56 N. H. 262, the 
court decided that a non-assenting stockholder may enjoin a pro­
posed purchase of its own shares by a corporation.
The advocates of the minority doctrine do not go so far as to 
say that there is a set rule that a corporation may not acquire its 
own stock. According to Chief Justice Owen, in Morgan v. 
Lewis (1888) 46 Oh. St. 1:
“. . . no inflexible rule has been recognized by this court, that a corporation 
may not in any case, nor for any purpose, receive its own stock. On the con­
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trary, the way is left open for the application of exceptions to the general rule 
in proper cases.”
Without express power given in its charter a corporation may 
take its stock incidentally in the ordinary course of business. 
Even though purchase is prohibited, many courts concede the 
right of a corporation to forfeit shares (Mitchell v. Blue Star 
Mining Company (1917) 98 Wash. 191; Lemoore Canal and Irriga­
tion Company v. McKenna (1912) 163 Cal. 736), because a com­
pany must have the power to recover stock when subscribers do 
not pay calls or assessments in order to protect itself from loss 
(Draper v. Blackwell (1903) 138 Ala. 182). In Trevor v. Whit­
worth (1887) L. R. 12 A. C. 409, Lord MacNaghten said:
“There can be no question as to the power of a company in a proper case to 
forfeit shares.”
Since forfeiture involves no outlay on the part of the corpora­
tion it would seem that there could be no objection to it. Lord 
Herschell, in Trevor v. Whitworth, says:
“The forfeiture of shares . . . does not involve any payment by the com­
pany, and it presumably exonerates from future liability those who have shown 
themselves unable to contribute what is due from them to the capital of the 
company.”
A similar statement was made by Lord Watson in the same 
decision.
If a stockholder voluntarily surrenders his shares where other­
wise forfeiture would be resorted to, the corporation may accept 
them {Alling v. Wenzel (1890) 133 Ill. 264). Such a creation of 
treasury stock is a harmless transaction {State v. Oberlin Building 
Association (1879) 35 Oh. St. 458; Crandall v. Lincoln (1884) 52 
Conn. 73). However, the surrender of shares calling for any 
monetary outlay is as objectionable as a purchase. According to 
Lord Herschell in Trevor v. Whitworth (1887) L. R. 12 A. C. 409: 
“Surrender . . . does not involve any payment out of the funds of the 
company. If the surrender were made in consideration of any such payment 
it would be neither more or less than a sale and open to the same objections. 
If it were accepted in a case when the company were in position to forfeit the 
shares, the transaction would seem to me perfectly valid.”
In the same decision Lord MacNaghten said:
“Surrender of shares stands on a different footing. It is not mentioned in 
the companies acts, but I conceive that there can be no objection to the sur­
render of shares which are liable to forfeiture. A surrender of shares in return 
for money paid by the company is a sale and open to the same objections as a 
sale, whatever expression may be used to describe or disguise the transaction.”
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In Hall v. Alabama Terminal (1911) 173 Ala. 398, the court held 
that it was a fraud on creditors for a corporation to purchase its 
shares in an attempt to discharge the liability of an original sub­
scriber for an unpaid subscription by the use of corporate assets. 
It has been decided in numerous cases that the cancellation of an 
enforcible claim against a subscriber was parting with valuable 
corporate assets (Sawyer v. Hoag (1873) 17 Wall. (U. S.) 610; 
Payne v. Brillard (1851) 23 Miss. 88; Harmon v. Hunt (1895) 116 
N. C. 678; Nichols v. Stevens (1894) 123 Mo. 96). According to 1 
Cook on Corporations (8th edition, 1923) sec. 168:
“The well-established rule, however, is that the corporate directors have no 
power to agree with a subscriber that his subscription shall be cancelled, unless 
such power is given by charter or statute or the by-laws of the corporation. 
The cancellation of a subscription differs little from a purchase by the corpora­
tion of its own stock.”
There is at least one contrary decision. In Shoemaker v. 
Washburn Lumber Company (1897) 97 Wis. 585, the court held 
that a release of unpaid subscriptions was valid against subse­
quent creditors. In his dissenting opinion in Grace Securities 
Corporation v. Roberts (1932) 164 S. E. 700, Justice Epes stated:
“. . . that where there is reasonable ground for belief that the subscriber is 
unable to meet his obligation to pay for the stock for which he has subscribed, 
courts will often uphold, as against non-assenting stockholders, and sometimes 
against creditors, the cancellation of a stock subscription.”
A corporation may acquire its own stock as security for an 
antecedent debt (Draper v. Blackwell (1903) 138 Ala. 182; German 
Savings Bank v. Wulfekuhler (1879) 19 Kan. 60). It may accept 
its stock as collateral for a debt and by enforcing its lien create 
treasury stock (City Bank v. Bruce (1858) 17 N. Y. 507; Williams 
v. Savage Manufacturing Company (1851) 3 Md. Ch. 452). In 
State v. Oberlin Building Association (1879) 35 Oh. St. 263, the 
court said :
“We do not deny that a corporation has power to receive shares of its stock 
as security for a debt or other similar purpose.”
However, the debt must not be otherwise collectible (Fitzpatrick 
v. McGregor (1909) 133 Ga. 332).
A corporation may take its own stock in compromise of a dis­
puted claim or a hopeless debt (Taylor v. Miami Exporting Com­
pany (1833) 6 Oh. 176; State v. Oberlin Building Association 
(1879) 35 Oh. St. 258). This is especially true when the debtor is
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insolvent (Bank v. Overman Carr Company (1899) 17 Oh. C. C. 
353). In Morgan v. Lewis (1888) 46 Oh. 1, Chief Justice Owen 
said:
"... the right of a corporation to take its own stock in satisfaction of a debt 
due to it, has long been recognized in this state.”
According to Justice McIlvaine in Coppin v. Greenless and 
Ransom Company (1882) 38 Oh. St. 275;
“ It is true, however, that in most jurisdictions, where the right of a corpora­
tion to traffic in its own stock has been denied, an exception to the rule has been 
admitted to exist, whereby a corporation has been allowed to take its own stock 
in satisfaction of a debt due to it. This exception is supposed to rest on a ne­
cessity which arises in order to avoid loss; ...”
In one of the latest treasury-stock decisions, Grace Securities 
Corporation v. Roberts (1932) 164 S. E. 700, Justice Epes, in a dis­
senting opinion, made this statement:
"... where the purchase of stock is made in good faith to save the corpora­
tion a loss upon a debt due it, the courts generally will uphold the transaction.”
A corporation may acquire its own stock in order to compromise 
internal dissension involving its stockholders (Cole v. Cole Realty 
Company (1912) 169 Mich. 347; Morgan v. Lewis (1888) 46 Oh. 
St. 6). Furthermore, it may get rid of opposition to legitimate 
corporate action by buying opposing shares (Stott v. Orloff (1933) 
261 Mich. 302).
A corporation may receive its shares by gift (Lake Superior 
Iron Company v. Drexel (1882) 90 N. Y. 87) or bequest (Rivanna 
Navigation Company v. Dawson (1846) 3 Gratt. (Va). 19; Sherman 
v. Shaughnessy (1910) 148 Mo. App. 679). It has been held that 
the power of a corporation to accept a bequest of outstanding 
shares could be questioned only by quo warranto. (See Fayette 
Land Company v. Louisville and Nashville R. R. (1896) 93 Va. 
274).
When stockholders are subject to double liability or the shares 
are only partly paid up, a gift destroys the security of the creditors 
(Bellerby v. Rowland (1902) 2 Ch. 14). In Barth v. Pock (1916) 
155 P. 282, many of the shareholders of a state bank donated a 
third of their stock to the bank for it to sell for the purpose of 
building up a surplus. While the stock was still unsold the bank 
failed and a creditor sought to enforce the statutory double 
liability on the unsold shares against the donors. The court held 
that the donors were liable. In Crease v. Babcock (1842) 10 Metc 
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(Mass.) 525, the court decided that where a statutory liability 
was imposed upon stockholders that this liability was not in­
creased by the presence of some of the stock in the hands of the 
corporation.
In Condouris v. Imperial Tobacco Company (1893) 22 N. Y. 
Supp. 695, the court held that there could be no objection to 
treasury stock created by operation of law.
When a corporation has issued and sold more stock than it is 
authorized to issue, it may repurchase enough of its shares to cor­
rect the wrong it has done (Kelly v. Central Union Fire Insurance 
Company, 101 Kan. 91).
Under the minority doctrine a purchase of its own shares by a 
corporation is ultra vires (4 Thompson on Corporations, 2d edi­
tion, secs. 4075, 4076; Maryland Trust Company v. National 
Mechanics' Bank (1906) 102 Md. 608; Wilson v. Torchon, 149 
S. W. 1156) but the transaction is not so objectionable as to justify 
quo warranto against the corporation (State v. Minnesota Thresher 
Manufacturing Company (1889) 40 Minn. 213).
The majority rule in the United States is that a corporation 
may acquire its own stock for legitimate corporate purposes if the 
rights of creditors are not involved (Wolfe v. Excelsior (1921) 270 
Pa. 547; Federal Mortgage Company v. Simes (1932) 245 N. W. 
169; Wolff v. Heidritter Lumber Company (1932) 163 A. 140; 
Brown v. Fire Insurance Company of Chicago (1932) 265 Ill. App. 
393).
Let us see what the courts have said about this rule. In 
Fremont Carriage Manufacturing Company v. Thomsen (1902) 
65 Neb. 370, this statement appears:
“The overwhelming weight of authority is that, unless prohibited by the 
statute or its own charter, a corporation may purchase its own shares of stock, 
to a reasonable amount, and for a legitimate purpose.”
According to the court in United States Mining Company v. 
Camden, 106 Va. 663:
“ In the absence of charter or statutory prohibition, it is well settled, indeed 
the prevailing doctrine in the United States, that corporations may purchase, 
hold and sell shares of their own stock provided they act in good faith and 
without intent to injure their creditors.”
In Atlanta v. Smith (1909) 141 Wis. 377, Justice Marshall said:
“ By a long line of decisions here, in the absence of a plain statutory provision 
to the contrary, and we have none, or such provision in the articles of organiza­
tion of the corporation, a corporation may, in general, so long as it acts in good 
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faith by authorization of its governing body, lawfully purchase its own stock, 
either as to stockholders or present or future creditors, and without such 
authorization its officers may, acting in good faith, do so as regards consenting 
stockholders or such creditors.”
A per-curiam opinion in Chicago v. Marseilles (1876) 84 Ill. 643 
contains this statement:
"These authorities, we think, fully recognize the power of the directors of a 
company, when not prohibited by their charter, to purchase shares of stock of 
their company. It falls within the scope of the power of the directors to man­
age and control the affairs and property of the company for the best interests 
of the stockholders, and when they have thus acted, we will presume, until the 
contrary is shown, that the purchase was for legitimate and authorized pur­
poses."
Judge Nelson gave this dictum in Lowe v. Pioneer Threshing 
Company (1895) 70 Fed. 646:
"In the absence of a charter provision or statute forbidding it, there is no 
reason why the stock should not be purchased, at least with the profits derived 
from the business of the corporation, where all the stockholders assent thereto.”
A more precise statement of the rule is given by Justice Epes 
in his dissenting opinion in Grace Securities Corporation v. Roberts 
(1932) 164 S. E. 700:
" In the absence of statutory or charter authority or inhibition, a contract by 
a corporation to purchase its own stock will be upheld or enforced against the 
corporation, provided (1) that it is made in good faith without intent to injure 
creditors or stockholders who have not expressly or impliedly given their assent 
to or ratified the making of the contract; and provided (2) that at the time of 
performance compliance with contract did not, or its enforcement will not, in 
fact, injure creditors or nonassenting stockholders.”
Since corporations may obtain their own shares in so many 
other ways it would seem that there is nothing inherent in their 
nature to forbid the power of purchase.
The power to purchase its own stock may be incidental and 
necessary to accomplish the object for which the corporation was 
created. In Dupee v. Boston Water Power Company (1873) 114 
Mass. 37, the court held that a corporation chartered to purchase 
and operate water-power plants could lawfully sell its sites and 
receive its own stock in payment when its water-power privileges 
were no longer profitable.
It has been held that a grant to acquire property generally for 
corporate purposes gives an implied power to the corporation to 
acquire its own stock (Iowa Lumber Company v. Foster (1878) 49 
Iowa 26; Chapman v. Iron Clad Rheostat Company (1898) 62 
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N. J. L. 497). Statutes and charters may directly authorize a 
corporation to purchase real and personal property. There are 
many decisions to the effect that a corporation’s own shares are 
personal property.
Let us trace the development of the majority doctrine. So far 
as I have been able to determine, the first decision involving the 
purchase by a corporation of its own stock is Hartridge v. Rockwell 
(1828) R. M. Charlt. (Ga.) 260. In this decision it was held that 
a bank could invest its idle capital in its own stock which it could 
thereafter sell. Although the court was aware that creditors 
might be concerned with the transaction, it was thought that the 
substitution of the stock for the money in the treasury protected 
them. Judge Davies said:
“ If from the course of the business, or the state of things, the capital of the 
bank can not be usefully employed in loans, there can, I think, be no objection 
against the purchase of its own stock. In such purchase a part of the capital 
is withdrawn, but is represented by the stock purchased; ...”
The next case seems to be Taylor v. Miami Exporting Company 
(1833) 6 Ohio 177. In this decision the court said:
“ It appears from the testimony in the case, that they (the directors) were at 
one time largely and profitably employed in buying and selling the stock of the 
Bank of the United States. If they could so invest their funds, why have they 
not power to buy and sell their own stock, if they ‘think it most advantageous 
to the company? ’ We think they have such power; and having it, they may 
fix the price, the mode of purchase and of payment.”
City Bank v. Bruce (1858) 17 N. Y. 507 is the basis for the New 
York rule permitting purchase. Although the corporation ac­
cepted its shares in payment of an antecedent debt, the language 
of the decision favors granting the power generally. The supreme 
court of the United States in Commissioners of Johnson County 
v. Thayer (1896) 94 U. S. 631, cited this decision for the broad 
proposition that a corporation may purchase its own shares even 
though no debt is involved. In Burnes v. Burnes (1905) 137 Fed. 
781, the court states as settled law that:
"... in the absence of constitutional or statutory prohibition, corporations 
have inherent power to buy, to sell and retire their own stock.”
Justice Marshall, in Atlanta v. Smith (1909) 141 Wis. 377, said:
”... by a long line of decisions here ... a corporation . . . may, in 
general, so long as it acts in good faith . . . purchase its own stock ...”
Many courts have held that a purchase of its own shares by a 
corporation does not effect a reduction of its capital stock. In 
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Dupee v. Boston Water Power Company (1873) 114 Mass. 37, 
after stating that a corporation could buy and sell its own stock, 
the court said :
“There is nothing in the vote of the corporation, or in the action of the direc­
tors, which amounts to a reduction of capital, ...”
In Leonard v. Draper (1905) 187 Mass. 536, it was held that a pur­
chase by a corporation of its own stock was not a reduction of 
capital stock, because the shares were kept ready for reissue. In 
Borg v. International Silver Company (1925) 11 Fed. (2d) 149, a 
stockholder sued to enjoin his company from selling at auction 
some of its own stock obtained through dissolution of a subsidiary. 
The corporation had been organized under the laws of New Jersey 
which had provisions for stock reduction, but there had been no 
attempt to comply with them. The bill was dismissed and the 
decree affirmed on appeal, on the ground that the capital stock 
had not been reduced by the purchase of these shares. Judge 
Hand said:
“We do not see how it can be thought that the shares in question were in fact 
retired. The New Jersey statutes (section 27, N. J. Corporation Law (P. L. 
1896, p. 277)) prescribed a method by which this could be done, and there was 
no pretense of following it . . .”
The following statement is found in 1 Cook on Corporations 
(7th edition, 1913) 811:
“. . . a mere transfer of stock to the corporation, whether the corporation 
assumes to buy the stock or the stockholders simply surrender it, will in no case 
constitute a reduction, when no formal reduction of the capital stock is made.”
Treasury stock remains in existence while in possession of the 
corporation (2 Cook on Corporations (8th edition, 1923) sec. 313). 
At least one contrary decision is found in the court reports. In 
Allen v. Francisco Sugar Company (1912) 193 Fed. 825, it was de­
cided that a corporation has:
“. . . an inherent right, for a bona-fide purpose, to retire by purchase its 
capital stock.”
Morawetz (1 Private Corporations (2d edition, 1886) sec. 112) 
favors the contrary view.
When a corporation buys back its own stock it is not necessarily 
trading in shares, for such a purchase may not be for the purpose 
of profit but may be a necessary measure for carrying on the cor­
porate business (American Railway Frog Company v. Haven (1869) 
101 Mass. 398; Williams v. Savage Manufacturing Company (1851) 
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3 Md. Ch. 418). Trading means first a purchase and then a sale. 
If no sale is intended or made a mere purchase of stock can not be 
termed trading.
Courts following the majority doctrine insist that a corporation 
purchasing its own shares may do so only from surplus available 
for dividends (Hall v. Henderson (1899) 126 Ala. 449; Grasselli 
Chemical Company v. Aetna Explosives Company (1918) 258 Fed. 
66; Western and Southern Fire Insurance Company v. Murphy 
(1916) 56 Okla. 702). Such a purchase, if made in good faith, is 
valid even as against creditors (Tierney v. Butler (1909) 144 Iowa 
553; Wolf v. Excelsior (1921) 270 Pa. 547. In Cross v. Beguelin 
(1929) 252 N. Y. 262, the court of appeals said:
“When made, the agreement . . . was valid. The surplus existed. After 
the corporation became financially embarrassed and the surplus shrank to a 
deficit, the agreement became unenforceable against the corporation.”
A similar ruling was made in Richards v. Wiener (1912) 207 N. Y. 
59 and McIntyre v. Bements' Sons Company (1906) 146 Mich. 74.
In Williams v. McLave (1915) 154 N. Y. Supp. 38, the court held 
that when the judgment of directors has been fairly exercised on 
the basis of values as they then existed a purchase of a corpora­
tion’s own stock can not subsequently be impeached because val­
ues have later depreciated. In Barrett v. Webster Lumber Com­
pany, 175 N. E. 765, the court went even further and said:
“ The contention of the plaintiff that a corporation can not purchase its own 
stock except out of surplus profits can not be sustained.”
The purchase of treasury stock must not reduce the corporate 
assets to an amount less than its debts and liabilities (Marvin v. 
Anderson (1901) 111 Wis. 387) nor impair capital (Hamor v. 
Taylor Rice Engineering Company (1897) 84 Fed. 392). A pur­
chase by an insolvent corporation of its own shares either by cash 
or a note should be voidable (In re Smith Lumber Company (1904) 
132 Fed. 618; Buck v. Ross (1896) 68 Conn. 29). The reason is 
that such a purchase is a fraud on prior creditors, because it is a 
distribution of assets for which nothing of value to the creditors 
is received in return, and it is a fraud on subsequent creditors 
because they contracted on the faith of assets represented by the 
capital stock. In Buck v. Ross, the court said:
“ If a corporation, by a purchase of shares of its own capital stock, thereby 
reduces its actual assets below its capital stock and debts, or if the actual assets 
at that time are less than the capital stock and debts, such purchase may be set 
aside.”
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According to the facts of Matter of Fechheimer-Fishel Company 
(1914) 212 Fed. 357, a solvent corporation bought its own stock 
and gave a note for the purchase price. When the note matured 
the corporation was insolvent. The court held that payment was 
postponed to general creditors. This decision does not seem 
reasonable. Since the purchase did not impair the capital at the 
time it was made, a valid debt was created, for which the note 
was simply a promise to pay (See 14 Columbia Law Review 
451).
In Topken, Loring and Schwartz v. Schwartz (1928) 249 N. Y. 
206, the court of appeals said:
“The capital of a corporation is held in trust for its creditors, so that any 
agreement to purchase stock from a stockholder, which may result in the im­
pairment of capital, will not be enforced, or will be considered illegal if the 
rights of creditors are affected.”
According to the decision in Rasmussen v. Roberge (1927) 194 
Wis. 362, a purchase of a company’s own stock is legal if it does 
not bring outright insolvency. There is at least one contrary 
decision. In In re Castle Braid Company (1906) 145 Fed. 224, 
the court held that an insolvent company might with the consent 
of all its stockholders purchase a majority of its shares, although 
such purchases involved the use of its capital. This decision 
is not in harmony with others on the point.
So far as creditors are concerned, the acquisition of treasury 
stock by purchase when a corporation is insolvent has precisely 
the same effect as the transfer of capital to the stockholders by the 
payment of a dividend. This, we know, is illegal.
Rights of creditors are involved in any return of capital to stock­
holders if the consideration given by them is simply a surrender of 
their stock. In Booth v. Union Fibre Company (1919) 171 N. W. 
307, a corporation promised to redeem its preferred stock at a 
specified price at a specified date, but when that date arrived the 
liabilities of the company exceeded its assets. The court held 
that the holders of the preferred were not entitled to redemption 
of their stock because the effect of redemption would be to imperil 
the rights of creditors. According to the facts of Johnson v. 
Canfield Swigart Company (1920) 292 Ill. 101, a corporation 
paid assets to stockholders to such an extent that it became in­
solvent. Existing creditors were paid by creating other creditors 
in their place. The court decided that the stockholders must 
refund.
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In Atlanta v. Smith (1909) 141 Wis.377, Justice Marshall gives 
the following summary:
“ In other words, a purchase by a corporation of its own stock known by the 
parties to the transaction, or which ought to be known by them, to render it 
insolvent, is not a purchase in good faith as to existing creditors and not such to 
future creditors if the parties to the transaction contemplate that the corpora­
tion will continue to do business and incur indebtedness, as before, on the faith 
of its previously supposed solvency continuing. In such a case the stock­
holder surrendering his stock is to be regarded as having acted fraudulently, 
at least constructively, as to existing creditors and subsequent creditors as well, 
and held, as to the latter, estopped by his conduct from denying his continu­
ance as a stockholder so far as such denial to effect would prejudice such credi­
tors trusting the corporation upon the appearance of solvency, and such con­
tinuance is necessary to liability to the corporation for the benefit of creditors 
or to statutory liability to them.”
The courts do not permit a corporation to purchase its own 
stock if creditors are injured thereby (Fremont Carriage Manu­
facturing Company v. Thomsen (1902) 65 Neb. 370). In Com­
mercial National Bank v. Burch, 141 Ill. 519, the court said:
“ Purchase of its own stock by a corporation by the exchange of its property 
of equal value, though made in good faith and without any element of fraud 
about it, there not being anything in the apparent condition of the company to 
interfere with the making of the exchange, will not be allowed where it injuri­
ously affects a creditor of the company, even though the fact of the indebted­
ness was not at the time established or known to the stockholders.”
Judge Wilson made the following statement in Fraser v. 
Ritchie (1881) 8 Ill. App. 554:
“The current of American authority . . . seems to be to the effect that 
‘ under certain circumstances and for certain purposes, moneyed corporations 
and corporations possessing banking powers, and in some instances other 
corporations,' may invest their funds in the purchase of their own stocks, sub­
ject to certain restrictions and limitations, one of which is that it shall not be 
done at such time and in such manner as to take away the security upon which 
the creditors of the corporation have the right to rely for the payment of their 
claims, or, in other words, so as not to diminish the fund created for their 
benefit.”
In Clapp v. Peterson (1882) 104 Ill. 26, this rule was applied to 
existing creditors, while the court in Marvin v. Anderson (1901) 
111 Wis. 387 refused relief to subsequent creditors. Several 
decisions (First National Bank v. Salem (1889) 39 Fed. 89; Shoe­
maker v. Washburn Lumber Company (1887) 97 Wis. 589) are to 
the effect that assenting or subsequent creditors can not complain. 
In the most recent decision that I have been able to find on the
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point, that of Campbell v. Grant Trust and Savings Company 
(1932) 182 N. E. 267, the court held that subsequent creditors of a 
corporation purchasing its own stock with corporate assets can 
not be regarded as prejudicially affected thereby. Creditors 
have no right to object when a corporation acquires treasury 
stock by purchase so long as the capital, on which they are pre­
sumed to rely, is kept intact (Joseph v. Raff (1903) 82 App. Div. 
(N. Y.) 47).
When a corporation purchases its own stock, the transaction 
must not cause loss to the minority stockholders. A stockholder, 
who has not assented to such purchase, whose rights would be en­
croached upon by it, is entitled to relief (Price v. Pine (1895) 41 
S. W. 1020; Lowe v. Pioneer Threshing Company (1895) 70 Fed. 
646). According to a per-curiam opinion in Chicago v. Marseilles 
(1877) 84 Ill. 643:
“ If it were shown that the purchase was made to promote the interests of the 
officers of the company above, and not of the stockholders generally, or if for 
the benefit of a portion of the stockholders and not all, or for the injury of all 
or only a portion of them, . . . then chancery would interfere.”
In each case where the right of acquiring its own stock is in­
volved the circumstances and purpose of the corporation must be 
examined. The law requires good faith on the part of the com­
pany. If the courts find a legitimate purpose back of the pur­
chase, with no injury to creditors, they generally uphold the 
transaction (Whitaker v. Grummond (1888) 68 Mich. 249). In 
Knickerbocker Implement Company v. State Board of Assessors 
(1907) 74 N. J. L. 583, the prosecuting corporation issued its 
stock to an existing corporation under a contract to return seventy 
five per cent of the shares for the creation of treasury stock which 
was to be sold as fully paid and non-assessable for the purpose of 
providing working capital for the new corporation. The court 
held that treasury stock acquired in these circumstances was not 
for a legitimate corporate purpose.
The directors or officers of the corporation usually have the 
power to buy back the corporation’s stock in the jurisdictions 
where such purchase is lawful (Phillips v. Riser (1911) 8 Ga. App. 
634). According to a per-curiam opinion in Chicago v. Marseilles 
(1877) 84 Ill. 643:
“ These authorities, we think, fully recognize the power of the directors of a 
company, when not prohibited by their charter to purchase shares of stock of 
their company.”
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In Thompson v. Shepherd (1932) 165 S. E. 796, it was held that 
generally the directors, not the courts, should determine the 
propriety of such a purchase. According to the facts of Federal 
Mortgage Company v. Simes (1932) 245 N. W. 169, the directors 
of a corporation sold their own stock in the company to it. In 
that transfer they represented both the corporation and them­
selves. Four out of the five directors owned the stock which was 
sold, and it was necessary for the vending directors to act for the 
corporation in order to constitute a quorum. Justice Owen held 
that the contract was voidable by the corporation, whether the 
company was injured or not. The price paid for the shares was 
reasonable although it was below par.
At least one court has held that special authorization is neces­
sary for the person buying the shares for the corporation. In 
Calteaux v. Mueller (1899) 102 Wis. 525, part of the opinion reads 
as follows:
“. . . a mere business manager of a corporate organization does not, by 
virtue of his office, ordinarily possess any such extraordinary authority as that 
of buying in its capital stock. . . . No court . . . goes so far as to hold that 
the power can be exercised by an officer of the corporation having no special 
authorization by the governing body so to do.”
In Thompson v. Shepherd (1932) 165 S. E. 796, the court de­
cided that a purchase by a corporation of its stock from a director 
is valid if free from fraud and made before bankruptcy when no. 
one-existing corporate liabilities exist.
It was held in Wood v. McLean Drug Company (1933) 266 Ill. 
App. 5, that directors of a corporation acting for the corporation 
in the purchase of its stock occupy a trust relation in respect to 
the stockholder from whom the stock is purchased and are under a 
duty to disclose to such stockholder the facts affecting the value 
of the stock.
In some circumstances the purchase of a corporation’s own  
stock may be set aside. Should the company become insolvent  
immediately after the purchase, creditors may treat the transfer 
as a fraudulent conveyance (Corn v. Skillern (1905) 75 Ark. 148; 
Buck v. Ross (1896) 68 Conn. 29; Hall v. Henderson (1899) 126 
Ala. 499; Roan v. Winn (1887) 93 Mo. 503). The vendor stock­
holder must know that the corporation is the buyer if the sale is 
to be nullified. If the purchase frees from individual liability 
a shareholder who would otherwise be personally liable to credi­
tors, it would seem reasonable to permit creditors to set aside the 
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transaction so far as the liability is concerned. A purchase of a 
corporation’s own shares can not subsequently be impeached if 
the corporate assets later depreciate in value (Williams v. 
McLave (1915) 154 N. Y. Supp. 38).
The courts are more harsh with officers of a corporation than 
with stockholders selling their shares to the company, but officers 
will not necessarily be liable in tort for misappropriation of funds 
where they have authorized a purchase of stock (Shoemaker v. 
Washburn Lumber Company (1897) 97 Wis 585) nor are they indi­
vidually liable to shareholders if the sale fails (Abeles v. Cochran 
(1879) 22 Kan. 405). In First National Bank v. Heller Sawdust 
Company (1927) 216 Mich. 464, a stockholder was held liable to a 
creditor of a corporation for money paid to him for his shares 
when the company had no surplus. It has been decided that 
stockholders are not liable for the unpaid subscriptions on the 
stock purchased by the corporation although they voted to au­
thorize the purchase (Crawford v. Roney (1906) 126 Ga. 763; 
Moon v. Waxahochie (1896) 13 Tex Civ. App. 103, affirmed (1896) 
89 Tex. 511).
There are numerous decisions involving the enforceability of a 
corporation’s contract to purchase its shares. In Gasser v. Great 
Northern Insurance Company (1920) 220 S. W. 203, upon issuing 
stock a corporation promised to refund the money paid for it un­
less the concern changed its place of business. It failed to change. 
The court held that if no rights of creditors were involved, stock­
holders, upon tender of the stock, were entitled to recover the 
money paid for it. A corporation under contract to buy back its 
own shares need not do so if it is insolvent at the date set for the 
transfer, because the effect would be to imperil creditors (Booth 
v. Union Fibre Company (1919) 171 N. W. 307; Richards v. 
Wiener (1912) 207 N. Y. 59; McIntyre v. Bement's Sons Company 
(1906) 146 Mich. 74). In Topken, Loring and Schwartz v. 
Schwartz (1928) 249 N. Y. 206, it was held that a promise by a 
corporation to purchase its own shares from an employee is not 
enforceable because there is no certainty that surplus funds will 
exist when the date of performance arrives. The promise is not 
good consideration because the act promised may be a crime, and 
therefore it does not create a valid contract. In re Fechheimer- 
Fishel Company (1914) 212 Fed. 357 is a decision in which the 
court decided that where a solvent corporation agrees to pur­
chase its own stock and gives a note in payment, the holder is
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postponed to general creditors, if at the time of payment, the 
corporation has no surplus. A similar rule was followed in 
Carter v. Boyden (1926) 13 Fed. (2d) 90; Keith v. Kilmer (1919) 
261 Fed. 733, and Hoover v. Schaefer (1916) 90 N. J. Eq. 164. In 
Wolff v. Heidritter Lumber Company (1932) 163 A. 140, Vice- 
Chancellor Buchanan made this statement in regard to Hoover 
v. Schaefer:
“ The basic principle in the Hoover case is that the assets of a corporation are 
primarily liable for the payment of its debts and that the stockholders can not 
take the corporate assets to repay themselves the money they invested, if such 
action leaves the corporation without sufficient assets to pay its creditors; . . .”
I have been able to find one contrary decision. In Davies v. 
Montana Auto Finance Corporation (1930) 86 Mont. 500, a sub­
scriber sued the defendant corporation on its promise to purchase 
its shares. The corporation’s defense was that it was financially 
unable to carry out the contract. Specific performance was 
decreed on the ground that the corporation failed to show that any 
creditor or stockholder would be injured by the purchase. In the 
opinion the court said:
“ Where the reason for the rule fails . . . We see no reason why the plaintiffs 
are not entitled to judgment, even if the corporation is insolvent.”
In other words, the fundamental reason for refusing to uphold or 
enforce a corporation’s contract to buy its own stock is the pro­
tection of creditors and the other stockholders of the company. 
Where such protection is not involved the contract should be 
enforced.
Corporations have been permitted to accept shares issued to a 
purchaser with an option to return them if he so elect (Schulte v. 
Boulevard (1913) 164 Cal. 464). In Kennerly v. Columbia Chemi­
cal Corporation (1923) 137 Va. 240, the plaintiff invested $15,000 in 
the defendant company’s stock upon the agreement of the com­
pany to take back two-thirds of the stock at the plaintiff’s option. 
It was held that the option was valid, and specific performance 
was decreed on the part of the defendant company. The court 
said that the weight of authority favors:
“. . . the validity of a contract of a corporation to repurchase its stock upon 
sale to a purchaser.”
Insolvency, however, will release the corporation. In In re 
Tichenor-Grand Company (1913) 203 Fed. 720, a corporation sold 
stock to the plaintiff who became an employee with an option 
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to leave at the end of three years and to sell the shares back to the 
company at par. After the corporation became bankrupt the 
plaintiff’s claim was dissolved by the court.
In Mulford v. Torrey Exploration Company (1909) 45 Colo. 81, 
a contract under which a corporation was to buy back its own 
shares at the option of the buyer was not called a purchase but a 
failure of a conditional sale, or its rescission. This excellent 
summary of the theory is found in 4 Fletcher’s Cyclopaedia of 
Corporations (Perm. Ed.) sec. 1538:
“According to the weight of authority, an agreement by which a purchaser 
may, at his option, at the end of a certain time, return the stock and receive 
back the price, or whereby the company agrees to repurchase it at an agreed 
price after a certain time, is in the nature of a conditional sale with an option 
to the purchaser to rescind, and is valid, provided there is sufficient considera­
tion which supports it and there is no fraudulent invasion of the rights of credi­
tors or of the other stockholders. A reason sometimes given for sustaining 
such agreements is that the contract is entire and indivisible, and that the 
sale cannot be sustained unless the contract to repurchase can be enforced; 
nor can the corporation be heard to say that the latter provision is ultra vires 
without rescinding the sale and returning the purchase money.”
Promoters of a corporation have no authority to bind the cor­
poration by a contract to repurchase stock subscribed for or sold 
for the account of the corporation (Reiff v. Nebraska California 
Colony, 277 Fed. 417; Drucklieb v. Harris, 209 N. Y. 211).
It has been held that treasury stock is not properly an asset of 
the purchasing corporation. In Stevens v. Olus Company (1911) 
130 N. Y. Supp. 22, a corporation with no surplus contracted to 
purchase its own stock. It sought to enforce the agreement by 
the argument that the treasury stock was an incoming asset which 
could be sold to others and balanced the money paid for it. The 
court held to the contrary. The court, in People v. Kelsey (1905) 
93 N. Y. Supp. 369, decided that in the computation of a franchise 
tax upon capital employed within the state, treasury stock was 
not to be included as an asset. In Borg v. International Silver 
Company (1925) 11 Fed. (2d) 147, Judge Hand made the following 
statement in regard to treasury stock:
“ To carry the shares as a liability and as an asset at cost is certainly a fiction, 
however admirable. They are not a liability, and on dissolution could not be 
so treated, because the obligor and obligee are one. They are not a present 
asset, because, as they stand, the defendant can not collect upon them. What 
in fact they are is an opportunity to acquire new assets for the corporate 
treasury by creating new obligations. In order to indicate this potentiality, 
it may be the best accounting to carry them as an asset at cost, providing, of 
195
The Journal of Accountancy
course, all other assets are so carried. Even so, a company which revalued its 
assets might properly carry them at their sale value when the revaluation was 
made. In any event there can be no ambiguity in stating the facts more 
directly, as the defendant did, that is, in treating the shares as not in existence 
while held in the treasury except as a possible source of assets at some future 
time, when by sale at once they become liabilities and their proceeds assets. It 
makes no difference whether this satisfies ideal accounting or not.”
There are two decisions to the effect that treasury stock is an 
asset. In Taylor v. Miami Exportation Company (1833) 6 Ohio 
83, it was held that where a corporation acquired its own shares 
in payment of a debt such shares may be held and sold as other 
property. The court, in Pabst v. Goodrich (1907) 113 N. W. 398, 
said:
“A solvent corporation may purchase its own stock and keep it alive and 
treat it as an asset.”
According to Ballantine in his Private Corporations (1927) 228, 
treasury stock is: “. . . alive and dormant.”
There seems to be only one decision involving an attempt of a 
creditor to obtain treasury stock as an asset (Coit v. Freed (1897) 
15 Utah 426).
When a corporation pays money or gives other property for its 
own shares it has parted with an asset. In return it has only the 
possibility of getting something to take the place of the asset by 
selling the shares. Until that time such shares are nothing, so 
far as value is concerned. The immediate effect upon creditors 
is the same as if the corporation had distributed a dividend equal 
to the purchase price. Treasury stock is not an asset available 
for the payment of debts. The corporation may sell the shares 
for assets and it may not.
Although a corporation owns its treasury stock, reasons of 
policy forbid it to exercise some of the natural incidents of owner­
ship. It may not vote such shares (American Railway Frog 
Company v. Haven (1869) 101 Mass. 398; McNeely v. Woodruff, 
13 N. J. L. 352). According to 14 Corpus Juris 904:
“Corporations have, as hereafter seen, a qualified power to deal in their own 
shares. . . . But stock thus owned or held by the corporation can not be voted 
at corporate elections, and this rule applies with equal force to stock held by 
trustees for the benefit of the corporation.”
The remaining stockholders have the sole voting privilege. A 
majority of the rest of the shares is a majority for the purpose of 
voting and for a quorum. In Market Street Railway v. Kellman 
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(1895) 109 Cal. 571, it was held that a statute requiring the con­
sent of three-fourths of the shareholders means the holders of 
three-fourths of the outstanding shares.
So long as treasury stock is held by a corporation, such stock 
can not participate in dividends (Vail v. Hamilton (1881) 85 N. Y. 
453; O'Connor v. International Silver Company (1904) 68 N. J. Eq. 
67). For financial purposes treasury stock has the same status as 
if it had been retired. According to the court in Enright v. Heck- 
scher (1917) 240 Fed. 863:
“ Indeed, the only difference between a share held in the treasury and one 
retired is that the first may be resold for what it will fetch in the market, while 
the second has disappeared altogether.”
Treasury stock may be redistributed among the shareholders 
(Coleman v. Columbia Oil Company (1865) 51 Pa. 74) and such a 
dividend may not be revoked (Dock v. Schlichter Jute Cordage 
Company (1895) 167 Pa. 370). This is true although a statutory 
prohibition of stock dividends exists (Commonwealth v. Boston 
and Albany Railroad (1886) 142 Mass. 146).
A corporation may reissue its treasury stock (Ralston v. Bank of 
California, 112 Cal. 208; 2 Cook on Corporations (8th edition, 
1923) sec. 313). The reissue, however, must be properly author­
ized (Dacovich v. Canizas (1907) 152 Ala. 287). A subsequent 
sale is not subject to the same regulation as an original issue and 
usually there is no liability on the part of the purchaser if he pays 
less than par (City Bank of Columbus v. Bruce (1858) 17 N. Y. 
507). Yet, in Barto v. Nix (1896) 15 Wash. 563, the court held 
that a subsequent purchaser was liable for full value in spite of an 
agreement to sell to him for less than par.
Existing stockholders have no right of preemption on a re­
issue of treasury stock which has been treated as general assets 
(Borg v. International Silver Company (1925) 11 Fed. (2d) 147; 
Crosby v. Stratton (1902) 17 Colo. App. 212; Hartridge v. Rockwell 
(1828) R. M. Charlt. (Ga.) 260; 14 Corpus Juris 396; 7 Ruling 
Case Law 206). In Borg. v. International Silver Company, Judge 
Hand said:
“ But treasury shares have by hypothesis once been issued, and have diluted, 
as it were, the shareholder’s voting power ab initio. He can not properly com­
plain that he is given no right to buy them when they are resold, because that 
merely restores the status he originally accepted. All he can demand is that 
they shall bring to the corporate treasury their existing value. If they do this, 
his proportion in any surplus is not affected ...”
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In Bonnet v. First National Bank of Eagle Pass (1900) 60 S. W. 
325, Justice Neill maintained that the right of preemption: .
applies only when the capital is actually increased, and not to a 
reissue of any portion of the original stock.”
Justice Thompson gives the following explanation in Crosby v. 
Stratton:
“But because, to prevent impairment of their interest, corporators have a 
preference in the purchase of unissued or new stock, it does not follow that they 
have any right over strangers in the purchase of stock which has been paid for 
and issued, but transferred back to the corporation as part of its general assets. 
The right in the one case is founded on reasons which have no existence in the 
other. The issued stock of a corporation represents its paid-up capital. The 
holder owns it and disposes of it as he sees fit, and if it finds its way back into the 
treasury, it becomes assets in the same sense that the corporation’s other prop­
erty is assets. It is still part of the paid-up capital; and its sale no more affects 
the value of the other stock, or the standing of the stockholders in the corpora­
tion, than the sale of the company’s tools or machinery. The relative value of 
all the stock is the same whether the particular stock of which we are speaking 
remains in the hands of the original holders, or has been acquired from them 
by the corporation and placed in its treasury. ... It is altogether immaterial 
whether the stockholders sold the stock themselves or turned it over to the 
company to be sold. In either case, they parted with all their interest in the 
stock, and put its further disposition beyond their control. So far as our re­
search has extended, the authorities are unanimous that where stock, once 
issued, returns to the possession of the corporation, upon its reissue and sale the 
right of purchase of stockholders and strangers is the same ...”
If treasury stock is cancelled, retired and later reissued, the 
holders of the original stock are entitled to an opportunity to 
purchase a proportional part of it. Justice Rosenberry made 
the following statement in Dunn v. Acme and Garage Company 
(1918) 168 Wis. 128:
"When the capital stock of the corporation has been decreased and it is pro­
posed to reissue the repurchased stock, every reason for making such reissue 
proportionate to the holdings of the then stockholders exists that would exist 
if such increase were of stock not theretofore issued or an increase in the author­
ized capital.”
The court admitted that a different question would have been 
presented if the treasury stock had been carried on the books as 
an asset.
Majority stockholders may not perpetuate their control by 
issuing treasury shares to their friends (Thomas v. International 
Silver Company (1907) 72 N. J. Eq. 224; Elliott v. Baker (1907) 
194 Mass. 518).
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In Pabst v. Goodrich (1907) 153 Wis. 43, reissued treasury stock 
was regarded as corpus of an estate.
The board of governors of the New York Stock exchange pro­
hibits listed investment companies from purchasing their own 
shares either directly or through subsidiaries. An allowance is 
made for peculiar circumstances in which purchases are permitted 
under surveillance of the governors. The London stock exchange 
goes further and prohibits all listed corporations from buying their 
own stock (Rules of the London Stock Exchange, March 23, 1921).
According to treasury department regulations 74, art. 66, nei­
ther taxable profit nor deductible loss can arise from transactions 
by a corporation in its own shares. This, however, does not 
mean that a commercial profit or loss can not be realized or in­
curred through dealing in treasury stock.
In The Journal of Accountancy for May I summarized the 
statutes relative to treasury stock. In the present article I have 
attempted to state the substance of the case law on the same sub­
ject. The two articles taken together give a fairly complete 
statement of the legal status of treasury stock at the present day.
